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The relationship between organizational structure and performance in small firms has 
received relatively limited attention over the last few decades. In understanding small 
firm performance this seems to be a serious omission. In this paper, we first present 
the rationale for including organizational structure in the analysis of small firm 
performance. Then, from the literature on organizational theory, we retrieve several 
dimensions that may be postulated to describe organizational structures of small 
firms. Based on the study of a stratified sample of 1411 Dutch small firms we show 
that nine structure stereotypes can be delineated. We further investigate the relevance 
of the empirical taxonomy by looking at the relationship with firm performance in 
terms of sales growth, profitability and innovativeness. Eventually, we conclude that 
organizational structure indeed matters and that it deserves to be taken into account in 
models and future analysis of small firm performance. 
JEL Code: M21, D21 
Key Words: Organizational structure, Small firm performance, innovativeness.  3
INTRODUCTION 
An important strand of the small business economics literature deals with 
understanding the determinants of small firm performance (e.g. Kimura, 2002; 
Audretsch, 2001; Robson and Bennett, 2000; Roper, 1999). In broad terms, firm 
performance is determined by the success of selling products and services in the 
market, and, by the effectiveness of organizing and transforming inputs (such as 
labour and capital) into sellable products and services (Nickell, 1996; Nickell et al, 
1997). For most small firms labour is the most important input (Heskel, 1999), which 
means almost by definition that organizational structure may be very relevant to small 
firm performance.  
In this article, we study the organizational structures of small firms and the link 
between these structures and the performance of the respective firms. One of the most 
elementary decisions a small firm owner or manager has to make is the design of the 
firm’s organization. As soon as a small firm hires employees, some kind of 
organizational structure develops. The actual design of this organizational structure is 
a mix between deliberate choices and unconscious, emergent developments. What 
evolves is a system of responsibilities, privileges and coordination mechanisms. The 
outcome of this organizational design process may be expected to be an important 
determinant of the performance of firms (Mintzberg, 1979; Jensen and Meckling, 
1992; Chaston, 1997; Athey and Roberts, 2001). 
Theoretical support for the relevance of organizational structures can be found 
ubiquitously. Sociologists, management scholars and economists have written on the 
subject. Firstly, many business school textbooks cover the topic in order to explain the 
essentials of organizations and management (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979; Robbins, 1990;  4
Burton and Obel, 1998). Several strategic management scholars have performed 
specific empirical studies on related topics (e.g. Wolf and Egelhoff, 2002; Lin and 
Germain, 2003). In this context, Doty et al (1993) explain that organizational design 
theory has developed from a normative, universalistic approach (promoting ‘the best 
structural form’), via a normative contingency theory approach (‘the best structural 
form exists given specific sets of conditions’), to the notion of equifinity (‘in a 
specific situation, multiple good solutions exist’), Unfortunately, the empirical 
relevance and rigor of the normative theories has not always been clear. Intuitively we 
agree with Donaldson (1987) when he states that a good fit means better performance. 
Studies that actually investigate performance in relation to organizational structures 
are relatively rare and do not find clear relations between structure and performance 
(e.g. Child, 1976; Covin and Slevin, 1988). The majority of studies are of a 
descriptive and predictive nature (Child ,1972; Pugh and Hickson, 1976) or they focus 
on one aspect of structure (e.g. Axley, 1992). Burton and Obel (1998) collected about 
450 rules for organizational design and put them into a consultant knowledge base. 
This could give the impression that the organizational structure problem is a done 
deal: put in your characteristics and your preferred structure is clear. However, for 
many of the rules it is unclear how they were derived: by rule of thumb, logical 
deduction or empirical research. Moreover, most rules are based on the study of large 
firms only. 
In mainstream economic literature, organizational structure has received exceptional 
attention over the last few years (e.g. Garicano, 2000, Maskin et al, 2000; MacDonald 
and Marx, 2001; Stein, 2002; Garicano and Hubbard, 2003). The topic has been on 
the agenda starting Williamson (1967), who pointed at diseconomies of scale caused 
by unbalances between firm size and organizational form. In subsequent years there  5
was attention to modelling organizational structures and the link with performance. 
Particularly, Arrow (1974) discusses the limits of the firm and shows that 
specialization leads to an additional need for coordination. Cremer (1980) studies the 
degree to which coordination mechanisms reduce uncertainties. Sah and Stiglitz 
(1986) investigate the consequence of (hierarchical) structures on the quality of 
decision making. Becker and Murphy (1992) focus on specialization and the division 
of labour, concluding that coordination costs determine efficiency of organizational 
structures. Aghion and Tirole (1997) investigate formal and real authoiry in 
organizations, particularly in relation to other coordination and communication 
mechanisms. In summary, great economists have tried to contribute to theory and 
thinking on the link between organizational structure and performance.  
In this study, we want to contribute to the above discussions. We search for insight in 
the relevance of organizational structure in small firms. Many studies agree that 
organizational size is one of the variables most closely related to organizational 
structure (for a review: Kimberly, 1976). Nevertheless, studies that actually focus on, 
or even include, small firms are scarce (e.g. Chaston 1997, Caruana 1998, Johnston 
2000). The studies that do investigate organizational structures in small firms mostly 
have a limited empirical base (50 to 250 cases), they pay attention to very few aspects 
of organizational structure, and they do not look into differences between various size 
classes. As a result, small firms are most frequently typecast as having ‘simple 
structures’ (Mintzberg, 1979). Theories of transaction costs and agency problems 
point in a similar direction. This study presents a quantitative study into the 
occurrence of structures of various types in small firms. We gain insight in the 
occurrence of typical organizational structures in small firms and we illustrate some 
of the impact of small firm structures on performance.  6
DIMENSIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
In this section, we present a brief review of several well-cited authors that have tried 
to define a coherent set of organizational structure variables (Pugh and Hickson, 1976; 
Mintzberg, 1979; Dewar et al, 1980; Geeraerts, 1984; Robbins, 1990; and Burton and 
Obel, 1998).  
Broadly speaking, organizational structure concerns (1) work division, the distribution 
of tasks and activities, and (2) coordination mechanisms, which includes 
standardization and formalization. The various authors use somewhat different 
dimensions of organizational structure. The early studies use specialization to describe 
how tasks are distributed among firm members. Geeraerts (1984) distinguishes 
specialization and differentiation (also referred to as departmentalisation). They both 
concern the ‘complexity’ of the organizational structure. As regards to the importance 
of separate attention to the locus of authority in decision-making (‘centralization’) and 
the relevance of codes and procedures for coordination (‘formalization’) most authors 
agree. A final dimension describes the way firms organise day-to-day (partly 
informal) coordination between individuals and departments. In this context, in line 
with Galbraith (1973), Mintzberg (1979) distinguished three main types of 
coordination: direct control, mutual adjustment and standardization. As said, in broad 
terms, specialization and decentralization are about how specific tasks and authorities 
are distributed in the organization, i.e. the work division. Formalization, 
standardization and coordination are subsequently about controlling and optimising 
organizational procedures, i.e. the coordination mechanisms.  7
CONFIGURATIONS 
Miller and Friesen (1986) have argued that multivariate interdependencies in structure 
(and strategy) tend to manifest themselves in so-called Gestalts. Max Weber already 
introduced the Gestalt ‘machine-bureaucracy’ proposing that specialization, 
formalized rules and procedures and an extensive hierarchy are positively related, and, 
that each of these structuring variables are negatively related to the centrality of 
decision making (see also Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). Other famous examples of 
configurations are the typology of Burns and Stalker (1961), who distinguish between 
organic and mechanistic organizations; Pugh and Hickson (1976), who propose a 
sevenfold classification of organizational structures; and Mintzberg (1979), who 
introduces five structural configurations ranging from a ‘simple structure’ to a 
‘multidivisional form’. Sometimes these configurations have been interpreted as ideal 
types (e.g. Mintzberg 1979), in other cases they were handled as observed, positively 
determined types (Pugh and Hickson 1976). Miller and Friesen (1980) demonstrate 
that changes (or stability) in organizational structure dimensions tend to occur 
together, or follow one another after brief intervals (in order to maintain an 
appropriate balance or ‘configuration’ of organizational structures). An important 
limitation of many of these typologies is that they are based on case studies and 
surveys of large firms. The small firm is often positioned as a caricature in one of the 
types, such as Burns and Stalker’s ‘organic organization’ or Mintzberg’s ‘simple 
structure’.  
  8
RESEARCH METHOD  
Three times a year, about 2,000 entrepreneurs of Dutch firms with less than one 
hundred employees participate in a Dutch small firm survey called the ‘MKB panel’. 
The survey waves are executed by means of 15-minute telephone interviews. The 
purpose of the survey cycle, which runs since 1999, is to gather systematic 
information about the attitudes, behaviour and performance of Dutch small firms. The 
sample is stratified in three size-classes and nine economic sectors. The sectors and 
size classes are sampled in equal strata
1. For each of the firms in the sample, control 
variables are available, specifically rather rudimentary measures of size, type of 
economic activity and location. For this study, a questionnaire was designed based on 
the theory of organizational structure and design outlined above. We have used 22 
items and several more open questions on performance in several years after 
measuring organizational structure. 3-point Likert scales are used in this study, since 
extensive test interviews show that in telephone interviewing respondents are unable 
to mentally map and repeatedly apply 5-point scales, let alone 7-point scales. 
Interviewees are strongly inclined to answer in their own (select) 3-point subscale.  
For the present investigation of organizational structure, we have a sample of 1411 
Dutch small firms that employ at least one person next to the owner (i.e. to have at 
least some sort of basic work division and coordination). As said, the firms are drawn 
from the population of Dutch small firms based on 27 equal strata by sector and size 
class. Response rates for the base wave on organizational structure are 72%. A letter 
by regular mail introduces the telephone interviews and the reported response rate is 
based on a maximum of three rounds of call and appointment attempts.  9
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Our data analysis consists of four steps. Firstly, we perform a factor analysis on the 
various items on organizational structure in the survey. Based on the resulting and 
reliable factors, we highlight several key features of the prevailing organizational 
structures of small firms. Then, by way of an elaborate cluster analysis, we investigate 
the occurrence of configurations of organizational structures. Finally and importantly, 
we show that there are systematic consequences of being a firm with a particular type 
of organizational structure. Regressions per type of firm are executed to investigate 
the comparative performance given size and sector. This evaluation of performance 
enables us to test several of the hypotheses that derive from the literature. Given the 
range of other topics tackled in the consecutive surveys many more topics and 
hypotheses could have been studied in combination with organizational structure and 
performance. Time and space limitations however have forced us to restrict ourselves 
to performance in terms of sales growth, profit-to-sales ratios and innovativeness. 
HYPOTHESES 
Organizations may be typecast as hierarchies of various forms. The multidivisional-
form (M-form), the unitary-form (U-form) and the matrix organization are the best-
known types (Harris and Raviv, 2002). In an M-form, separate departments exist for 
different sets of products or customers. For large firms these departments are often 
referred to as ‘divisions’. Within a U-form, separate departments exist for different 
functional specializations. Finally, a matrix organization combines both dimensions of 
work division. For small firms, one would expect the complexity to be very limited. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 Size classes are 0-9 employees, 10-49 employees and 50-99 employees. Sectors are: Manufacturing, 
Construction, Wholesale and retail, Hotels and restaurants, Transport, Business services, Financial  10
Based on coordination and transaction cost arguments, the above structures are 
expected to be absent or very rare and inefficient in small firms. This leads us to the 
main hypothesis of this study. The larger the firm, the more attractive and effective it 
is to develop a complex structure, which leads us to formulate three more hypotheses. 
H1.  Small firms occur in a limited variety of organizational structures 
H2.  Highly departmentalised firms will be large 
H3.  Smaller, yet highly-departmentalised firms will not perform well 
H4. Larger,  yet  non-departmentalised firms will not perform well 
Alternative theories, for instance team theory (Marshak and Radner, 1972), propose 
that in many contexts it is efficient for firms to decentralize authority and information 
processing (Radner, 1992, Lenox, 2002).  
H5.  Small firms with a strongly decentralized structure perform well. 
Alternatively, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) posit that hierarchies are a response to 
incentive problems associated with team production. They suggest that division of 
labour and centralization are needed. Along this line upper-level individuals specialize 
in monitoring lower level ‘production’ workers (cf. Calvo and Weillisz, 1978).  
H6.  Small firms strong centralization and vertical specialization perform well.  
Hart and Moore (1999) suggest hierarchies may be viewed as chains of authority in 
decision-making. The manager-entrepreneur in this context is a (central) coordinator 
of workers in (multiple levels of) specialized production (see also Cremer, 1980).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
services, Personal services and Non-private (includes healthcare, farming).  11
H7. Hierarchical,  centralized  structures with strongly specialized employees 
perform well.  
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Garicano (2000) another motivation for 
division of work lies in the opportunities to exploit (local) increasing returns to scale 
for specific (scarce, complex) skills. This may very well call for sophisticated 
coordination of work. 
H8.  Firms with highly specialized workers will be larger 
H9.  Firms with highly specialized workers will perform well. 
Given that under uncertainty this coordination may be problematic, an opposite 
incentive for diversification and simple structures is also present (Garicano and 
Hubbard, 2003). 
H10. Non-specialized, simple organizational structures perform well  
Contingency theory proposes that different organizational structures are appropriate 
given the requirements of the different contexts (Burns and Stalker, 1961). 
H11. Given contextual conditions, different types of organizational structures may 
perform better. 
Doty et al (1993) suggest that given uncertainty in most circumstances multiple 
‘good’ and no best solutions exist. 
H12. Given contextual conditions, different types of organizational structures will 
perform equally well, particularly in the longer run.  12
VARIABLES 
As explained above, we want to include five 'structural dimensions' in our analysis: 
departmentalisation, specialization, decentralization, coordination and formalization. 
In principle, it would have been preferable to only use existing, validated scales. For 
several reasons, however, we have chosen to use a different and more limited set of 
items. Firstly, many previous studies have focussed on only a few of the structure 
dimensions. Secondly, most studies were aimed at large multinational companies, 
which obviously is a different audience than our small firm entrepreneurs. The 
transferability of proven scales is therefore a bit questionable. For example, Pugh et al 
(1968) use 55 (sub-)items to measure formalization alone, while their centralization 
questions are repeated for 11(!) different types of decisions. Dewar et al (1980), use 9 
items to measure centralization. Morrison and Roth (1993) use 10 items to measure 
centralisation, 8 to measure specialisation and another 6 to measure formalisation. 
Such numbers of items are detrimental to the response rates for our method of 
research. It is simply infeasible for telephone interviewing. Our questionnaire had to 
be short and easy to understand. Large number of items cannot be covered in 
telephone surveys since the quality of responses sharply decreases. The major 
advantage of telephone surveys is of course that response rates can be achieved that 
are infeasible with other methods of research. Response rates are particularly good in 
a committed setting as in this study. Furthermore, many of the existing scales on 
organizational structure are less suitable since they were developed for employees as 
respondents instead of (small) business owners (e.g. Caruana et al, 1998). Thus, 
instead of choosing a limited number of specific items from well-cited studies (which 
would force us to be incomplete), we reformulate items in short and general 
statements that are suitable for telephone interviewing. An additional benefit of this  13
procedure is that the newly developed items are relevant to firm in any sector, which 
is important since we would like to derive conclusions on small firms in as general 
terms as possible. The developed questionnaire was tested in about ten pilot 
interviews with small firm owners and some employees to get some indication of 
robustness. Several questions were reformulated or dropped in this process. In 
particular, it was decided at this stage to limit the number of items to twenty-two 
instead of thirty-nine. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 1 presents an overview of the items that are used in this study. Firstly, the 
dimension of departmentalisation is covered by seven items, representing vertical 
differentiation and horizontal departmentalisation (Robbins 1990, Rivkin and 
Siggelkow, 2003). The three items relating to vertical differentiation are indicators 
related to the hierarchy and complexity of the organization: the number of separate 
organisational units, the number of hierarchical levels and the number of managers. 
The four items relating to horizontal departmentalisation refer to divisional and 
functional groupings (see e.g. Mintzberg, 1983; Carson et al, 1995).  
Secondly, specialization was measured by four items representing specialization of 
tasks and skills. Two items concern specialization of tasks, also referred to as 
functional specialization (Pugh et al, 1969; Robbins, 1990). This type of 
specialization closely links to the concept of job rotation (Dewar et al, 1980). Another 
two items concern the specialization of skills, also referred to as social specialization  14
(Robbins 1990). This relates to actual ‘specialists’ and ‘irreplaceable’ personnel {e.g. 
Mintzberg, 1983).  
Thirdly, decentralisation was measured by four items distinguishing authority on a 
strategic and an operational level. Furthermore, we follow Dewar et al (1980) and 
Richardson et al (2002) by including items for decentralisation of authority and 
decentralization in participation (which of course is weaker). Following Pugh et al 
(1968), we allow for differences in the nature of (de)centralization for operational 
versus strategic decisions.  
Finally, we include seven items relating to the coordination mechanisms within the 
firm. Items are included for written procedures (Oldham and Hackman, 1981) and for 
formal communication (cf. Pugh et al, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983). Furthermore, we 
include an item representing self-guidance plus four items for personal and 
impersonal directive mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1983).  
The control variables that were included in the questionnaire are measured by industry 
(9 classes), size (number of employees) and strategy (one item for each generic 
strategy, based on Porter, 1985).  
We used multiple measures of firm performance to reflect the multi-dimensionality of 
performance. Since some respondents were expected to be unwilling to provide 
detailed and comparable accounting data, the entrepreneurs were also asked to rate 
their firm's sales and profit performance relative to the preceding year. Following 
Dess and Robinson (1984) we included an additional item on the firms profitability 
compared to similar firms, i.e. competitors.  15
RESULTS 
The twenty-two items on organizational structure listed above combine to nine factors 
in an unrestricted principal component analysis. In order to arrive at more easily 
interpretable results Varimax rotation was used. The nine empirically derived 
components capture critical variations in organizational structure in small firms. Table 
2 below shows an overview of contributing item coefficients with an absolute value 
larger than 40%.  
The factors result in orderings that are largely expected: departmentalisation splits 
into a component of hierarchical complexity and a component of divisional/functional 
complexity. Specialization splits into task diversity and employee specialization. 
Decentralization has components for operational and strategic influence. Coordination 
is the most special case. Formalization and standardization are found to largely 
overlap (factor 9). Furthermore several less formal coordination mechanisms remain. 
Direct coordination by the entrepreneur contributes to the hierarchical complexity. 
Informal team coordination is responsible for a separate component. Self-coordination 
is the only significant contributor to factor 8. Interestingly enough, both informal 
team-coordination and self-coordination are apparently rather independent from the 
other organizational structure items. Furthermore, they vary substantially across small 
firms (otherwise they would not qualify as ‘independent’ factors). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
  16
Based on the contributions to the components above, we directly construct scales for 
nine dimensions of organizational structure. For each of these constructs Crohnbach’s 
α is acceptable (> 0.6). The scales are direct sums of the set of significantly 
contributing items per component. 
 
Further analysis of the constructs teaches us that the myth “small firms are informal, 
unstructured and centralised” appears to be untrue. The larger firms in our sample are 
more standardised, but considerable variation exists, also among the smaller firms. 
The departmentalisation of larger firms is more complex, but quite a few of the firms 
with less employees are pretty complex in their structure. Task diversity decreases and 
employee specialization increases as small firms are larger, but - once again – a whole 
range of smaller firms show more specialization than larger ones. For operational 
decisions, larger firms are a bit more decentralised than smaller ones. For strategic 
decisions there is no systematic difference between various small and medium sized 
firms, nor there is for self-coordination.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Next, given the variations of the nine constructs, we are interested to learn whether 
systematic organization types can be delineated. Testing for the optimal number of 
clusters by way of the sum of squared distances to the cluster centres
2, we arrive at 
nine typical organization structures, which will be discussed below.  
                                                           
2 There is a ‘kink’ in the SSD-plot from introduction of the eighth to the ninth cluster. The sums of 
squared distances were plotted for two to twenty clusters.  17
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The first organizational structure (entrepreneur with a ‘submissive’ team) is 
characterized by an authoritarian entrepreneur and several quite independent 
employees. The employees have limited influence on decision-making. Coordination 
mainly occurs through informal team processes.  
The second structure (co-working boss with an open structure) is characterized by 
employees that are highly involved in operational decision-making. Coordination also 
mainly occurs through informal team processes. Departmentalisation and 
specialization are limited. 
The third structure (an entrepreneurial team) concerns firms characterized by 
employees closely involved in strategic and operational decision-making. 
Formalization is low. Coordination occurs through team processes, under substantial 
specialization. 
The fourth structure (boss - loose control) concerns firms characterized by 
independent employees that are relatively uncoordinated. The entrepreneur is not very 
authoritarian or formal, yet (s)he does make all decisions. Departmentalisation and 
specialization are limited. 
The fifth structure (boss – tight control) has few tasks and responsibilities defined 
beyond that of the dominant entrepreneur-owner-decision maker. Specialization is 
low, the use of formal and informal coordination mechanisms limited.   18
The sixth structure (singular structure) has few divisional or functional departments. 
The entrepreneur is important, not extremely dominant, yet employees have limited 
leeway for self-coordination. Specialization and formalization are rather simple. 
The seventh structure (U-form) is simple, yet rather strongly hierarchical in structure. 
Formalization is substantial and employees are rather specialized in their capabilities. 
The entrepreneur must involve employees in decision-making in order to be 
sufficiently informed. 
The eighth structure (matrix organization) is flat, yet rather strongly functionally and 
divisionally departmentalised. Formalization has to be relatively large for 
communication and coordination to work well. Decentralization is limited and within 
departments specialization is low.   
The ninth and final structure (M-form) is hierarchically structured and 
departmentalised in divisions. A substantial part of the employees are specialized 
professionals and involved in decision making. Formalization is substantial, like in the 
last two organizational structures. 
 
Finally, for the nine organizational structures, we study the performance in terms of 
sales growth, profit to sales and innovativeness. If structure does not match size and 
sector, one would expect a lower performance. Below, we present the results in three 
tables. We show in which sectors the various organizational structures perform 
relatively well, and, in which they perform relatively poorly. It is interesting and 
important to note that each of the organizational structures occurs widely across 
sectors.  
  19
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
In terms of 3-year persistent sales growth, ‘co-working bosses with an open structure’ 
seem to perform rather well in the construction sector. ‘Entrepreneurial teams’ 
perform rather well in business services and manufacturing sectors. The ‘M-form’ 
performs well in financial services. By contrast, ‘singular structures’ in manufacturing 
and business service sectors are not good for sales growth, neither are entrepreneurial 
teams in personal services. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Contrarily, in terms of persistently ‘good’ profit to sales ratios, ‘entrepreneurial 
teams’ in personal services perform well. This also holds for ‘U-forms’ in financial 
service and leisure sectors. Simple hierarchical structures are good for profit to sales 
ratios in business services (‘bosses - loose control’ and ‘bosses - tight control’). 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Finally, in terms of innovativeness, simple, hierarchical and entrepreneur-dominated 
firms do not perform well, except perhaps for particular larger organizational 
structures in business services and manufacturing. M-forms are relatively innovative 
in financial services and manufacturing, matrix structures are relatively innovative in  20
services. U-forms appear to be less innovative in wholesale, retail, transport and in the 
hotel and restaurant businesses. Larger entrepreneurial teams appear to perform well 
in terms of innovation, except in the construction sector. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Coupling these results back to the literature and the hypotheses formulated above, we 
can draw the following conclusions.  
To begin with, contrary to our first and main hypothesis, we find small firms to occur 
in a wide variety of organizational structures. We find organizational structures with 
various degrees of departmentalisation to coexist. Contrary to the second hypothesis, 
we find that small firms as well as larger firms may exhibit substantial 
departmentalisation. Nevertheless, we do find a strong correlation between 
departmentalisation and firm size. Contrary to hypotheses H3 and H4 small 
departmentalised or large non-departmentalised firms do not perform systematically 
worse than large departmentalised or small non-departmentalised firms. In line with 
Radner (1992) and Lenox (2002), we find that strongly decentralized structures 
perform well in several contexts, notably in business services and manufacturing. 
Several rather centralized structures perform equally well though, even in the same 
contexts. Contrary to our sixth hypothesis and contrary to the seminal work by 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), we find that firms with strong centralization and strong 
vertical specialization only occur and only perform well in relatively simple 
structures. Apparently, for larger firms strict vertical specialization requires at least 
some decentralization in order to be efficient. Subsequently, in line with hypothesis 
H7 and in accordance with Hart and Moore (1999), we find hierarchical, centralized 
structures with strongly specialized employees to occur frequently and to perform  21
well in terms of growth. In line with Grossman and Hart (1986) and Garicano (2000), 
we also find firms with substantial specialization to be larger. In combination with 
complex coordination mechanisms, M-forms perform well in terms of growth as well, 
particularly in manufacturing and financial services. Especially the relatively small 
M-form firms are able to achieve impressive growth figures. Non-specialized, simple 
organizational structures in business services perform well in terms of profit to sales 
ratios (Garicano and Hubbard, 2003). Finally, we do not find that there is ‘one best 
way of organizing’. Some organizational structures appear to perform better in 
specific sectors (hypothesis H11). In line with Doty et al (1993) we find support for 
the hypothesis H12. Given contextual conditions, different types of organizational 
structures perform equally well (over the period 2001-2003). 
All in all, from this article it is quite clear that the relationship between organizational 
structure and small firm performance is more relevant and more complex than 
commonly assumed. Small firms are very diverse in terms of organizational structure, 
both across sectors and size classes. The analysis here has obviously been rather 
rudimentary and more thorough analysis is needed. Other features of the context, such 
as the number of customers, the number of competitors, the number of suppliers seem 
very relevant interacting variables. Also, the actual use of inputs and assets in the 
organization would be essential to include in further, more advanced analysis. This 
study has nonetheless provided clear indications that organizational structures are 
more diverse and relevant to small firm performance than commonly assumed. 
Organizational structure should be included in studies aimed at a better understanding 
the determinants of small firm performance.   22
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Table 1   Variables in the analysis 
Variable description  Type   
CONTROL VARIABLES     
line of business 




DIVISION OF WORK: COMPLEXITY 1, DEPARTMENTALISATION 
hierarchy 
separate organizational units  
number of hierarchical levels 
number of managers 
 
boolean  
scale (max. 10)  
scale (max. 10) 
 
Divisional/functional configuration 
tasks grouped by product/service 
tasks grouped by customer group/segment 
task grouped by geographical region 







DIVISION OF WORK: COMPLEXITY 2, SPECIALIZATION 
task diversity 
job rotation: employees fulfil multiple jobs/functions 








employee specificity: tasks are specific to employees 





DIVISION OF WORK: DECENTRALIZATION     
strategic decisions 
strategic influence by employees 
strategic autonomy by employees 
operational decisions 
operational influence by employees 








COORDINATION: COORDINATION MECHANISMS     
personal coordination 
direct control of owner/manager 








standardization of activities (fixed work process) 








use of formal communication procedures 





PERFORMANCE     
Realized sales growth 2001, 2002 and 2003 (dln) 
Realized profit to sales ratios 2001, 2002, 2003 






Table 2   The main components of organizational structure in SMEs 
  COMPONENTS 
ITEMS  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
departmentalisation            
separate  organizational  units    0.649          
number  of  hierarchical  levels  0.690          
number  of  managers  0.757          
tasks  grouped  by  product/service           -0.455 
tasks  grouped  by  customer  group    0.633         
task  grouped  by  geograph.region    0.777         
tasks  grouped  by  process    0.423         
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n             
job  rotation     0.492     0.489    
job  variety     0.795        
employee  specificity      0.483       
employee  replaceability      0.789       
decentralization            
strategic  influence       0.827      
strategic  autonomy       0.874      
operational  influence        0.903     
operational  autonomy        0.910     
coordination            
direct  control  by  owner/manager  -0.538          
informal  team  coordination        0.674    
self-coordination          0.821   
formalization            
standardization  of  activities          0.572 
standardization  of  goals           0.665 
formal  communicat.  procedures           0.681 
written  formal  procedures           0.644 
(Principal Component Analysis followed by varimax rotation (convergence after 12 iterations). The kink in the 
scree plot determined the number of factors. The ninth unrotated factor had an eigenvalue of 0.955. Only 
contributions exceeding 0.40 are listed.   
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